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The evolutionary significance of costly
punishment is still to be demonstrated
Costly punishment represents an evolutionary puzzle because it
involves an individual paying a cost to harm another individual
(1, 2). A recent study by Wu et al. (3) confirmed earlier conclu-
sions (4) that costly punishment is mostly maladaptive and may
have evolved for other reasons. We welcome their emphasis on
cultural differences in experimental games (5), but we argue that
these first tests (3, 4) are not yet conclusive with regard to the
functional significance of costly punishment. There are three
problems: (i) the definition of ‘‘defection’’ in their Prisoner’s Di-
lemma is problematic for studies on punishment, (ii) a closer
examination of their payoff matrices reveals them to be noncon-
ducive to punishment, and (iii) their specific game structure im-
poses an additional opportunity cost that further reduces the
effectiveness of punishment.
In Wu et al.’s experiment (3), individuals play a repeated
game in pairs and can choose between three options: ‘‘coop-
erate’’ (C; giving their partner a benefit !b at a personal cost
"c), ‘‘defect’’ (D; inflicting a cost of "d on their partner
while gaining !d for themselves), and ‘‘punish’’ (P; paying a
cost of "! to inflict a greater cost of "" on their partner).
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In their experiments, ! # 1, " # 4, d # 1, c # 1, and b is


















! 2 "2 "54 0 "3
2 "2 "5
"
The most parsimonious definition of defection is d # 0. De-
fection is then simply the absence of cooperation. With d $
0, however, a new element is introduced, where ‘‘defection’’
then means taking something ("d) from the other person.
This is problematic in studies on punishment because it is
now unclear whether punishment in the experimental game is
a reaction to the absence of cooperation or to the immediate
loss that defection has inflicted.
If the participants of the experimental game did not bother
about the immediate loss inflicted by defection but simply
interpreted defection as the absence of cooperation, the pay-
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We can rederive the original payoff matrix of Wu et al. (3) by
setting c # 2, ! # 2 and " # 3 in both of their matrices, and
b # 3 in the first and b # 4 in the second. The efficiency ra-
tio of punishment is then !:" # 2:3 which is far less condu-
cive to punishment than the !:" # 1:4 punishment ratio as-
sumed by the authors (3, 4).
A further problem with the experimental set-up is that players
can only choose between cooperating, defecting, or punishing. A
‘‘defection’’ can then only be punished in the next round of si-
multaneous choices, i.e., choosing to punish results in the indi-
vidual forfeiting a potential act of cooperation or ‘‘defection.’’
Punishment seems more likely to promote cooperation if punish-
ing, or not punishing, is a separate decision between two rounds
of cooperating or not cooperating.
In conclusion, the game settings that have been used in re-
cent studies (3, 4) on the evolutionary significance of costly
punishment are problematic. It can therefore not yet be con-
cluded that costly punishment is unlikely to evolve to increase
cooperation.
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